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A time machine that sends information back to the past may, in principle, be built using closed
time-like curves. However, the realization of a time machine must be congruent with apparent
paradoxes that arise from traveling back in time. Using a simple model to analyze the consequences
of time travel, we show that several paradoxes, including the grandfather paradox and Deutsch’s
unproven theorem paradox, are precluded by basic axioms of probability. However, our model does
not prohibit traveling back in time to affect past events in a self-consistent manner.
I. BACKGROUND
The possibility of building a time machine has been
proposed by many authors [1–14]. Two common ap-
proaches are through closed time-like curves (CTC) [1–9]
and quantum phenomena [10–13]. Although the general
theory of relativity allows for CTCs, it is not clear if the
laws of physics permit their existence [15–18]. Hence the
possibility of traveling back to the distant past remains
an open question. Paradoxical thought experiments have
been devised to suggest that traveling back in time may
lead to violations of causality, and hence is not possible.
The most famous paradox is the grandfather paradox, in
which an agent travels back in time to kill his grandfather
before his father was conceived. In this case, the agent
will not exist at the current time and hence cannot travel
back in time to kill his grandfather. An alternative ver-
sion of the grandfather paradox is autoinfanticide, where
an agent travels back in time to kill himself as an infant.
This paradox plays a central role in the argument against
traveling back in time. Another paradox is the Deutsch’s
unproven theorem paradox [11], in which an agent travels
back in time to reveal the proof of a mathematical theo-
rem. The proof is then recorded in a document that the
agent reads in future time. Another version of Deutsch’s
unproven paradox is what we call the chicken-and-egg
paradox. A hen travels back in time to lay an egg. The
egg hatches into the hen herself. Without the egg, the
hen would not exist but without the hen traveling back
in time, the egg would not be laid.
In this paper, a simple model is used in an attempt
to solve time travel paradoxes and help set the logical
foundations of traveling back in time. Our approach is
quite different from approaches that focus on how a time
machine can be built (in principle) [11]. We suppose that
a time machine can be built and then analyze what could
be possible (or impossible) in time travel. We use a sim-
ple directed cyclic graph to explain causal relationships in
different scenarios of time travel. Our conclusion is that,
assuming traveling back in time is feasible, an agent who
travels back in time is unable to kill himself although he
may be able to alter the past in other ways; in a self-
consistent manner.
The self-consistency principle was proposed by
Wheeler and Feynman [19], Novikov et al [14] and Lloyd
et al [11]. It states that traveling back in time may be
possible, but it cannot happen in a way that violates
causality. Causality in this case includes events that hap-
pen in the future affecting the past. This principle pre-
cludes time travel paradoxes but does not forbid travel-
ing back in time. Due to space limitations, the reader
is referred to [11, 14, 19] for detailed discussion of the
self-consistency principle.
II. MODEL
Our model can be considered as a simple case of graph-
ical models. Graphical models have been extensively
studied and are applicable in many fields such as in
econometric models, social sciences, artificial intelligence
and even in medical studies. Publications on graphical
models are so numerous that we can only provide a non-
exhaustive list [20–32]. Although directed acyclic graphs
have been at the center stage of graphical models, di-
rected cyclic graphical models have also received signif-
icant attention [28–32]. Two important components in
graphical models are intervention and the do calculus.
The theory of graphical models has few constraints built
in on what is physically possible. This leaves the theory
very general.
σ1 → σ2 → σ3 → σ4 · · · → σi · · · → σk · · · → σn
FIG. 1. A simple graphical model for a Markov Chain
We use a simple directed cyclic graph to study trav-
eling back in time. First, we build constraints into our
model as follows. Consider physical states evolving on
a timeline as shown in Fig. 1. The graph is a one di-
mensional chain, and branching is excluded. Traveling
back in time introduces a loop as in Fig. 2. We do not
include intervention and do calculus because this enables
us to simplify our analysis, while capturing the important
physics for a closed system.
σ1 → σ2 → σ3 → σ4 · · · → σi · · · → σk · · · → σn
✻
FIG. 2. A simple cyclic graph to model traveling back in time
from t = k to t = i.
At each time t, the state of the system σt is a random
variable. Time is also discretized and the arrows connect
2events at neighboring times σt → σt+1. The probability
of transition from σt to σt+1 is given by Tt+1(σt+1|σt). In
this case, the conditional probabilities can be interpreted
as a transition matrix, and the graph as a Markov Chain.
The following assumptions are used based on physical
considerations:
1. The statistical time flows in the same direction as
the physical time.
2. Local normalization constraint is enforced, i.e.∑
σt+1
Tt+1(σt+1|σt) = 1. Given that the sys-
tem is in a state σt at time t, the system has
to take on a state at t + 1. In general, we
can condition on more than one variable, e.g.
Tt+1(σt+1|σi, σj , · · ·), then the local normalization
condition is
∑
σt+1
Tt+1(σt+1|σi, σj , · · ·) = 1.
3. Basic probability axioms are satisfied. Let Ai be a
set of states and P (Ai) be its probability measure,
then,
0 ≤ P (Ai) ≤ 1 (1)
P (Ω) = 1, (2)
P (Ai ∪ Aj) = P (Ai) + P (Aj), (3)
Ω is the set of all possible states and Ai and Aj
are mutually exclusive. Clearly, for discrete events
if σi ∈ Ω and σj ∈ Ω, σi 6= σj , then P (σi ∪ σj) =
P (σi) + P (σj). Here, we use a shorthand notation
σi ≡ {σi}.
A sequence of states pin is shown in Fig. 1. If the set
of all possible states is given by Ω, then the set of all
possible sequences is given by Π = Ωn. The probability
of obtaining pin is,
Pmc(pin) = p(σ1)T2(σ2|σ1)T3(σ3|σ2) · · ·Tn(σn|σn−1)
(4)
p(σ1) is the probability of sampling the initial state σ1.
The conditional probabilities encode the physics of how
the system evolve from state to state. It can be shown
that for Pmc(pin), basic axioms of probabilities hold.
In the case of traveling back in time, the causal rela-
tionship has an arrow that loops back into the past (Fig.
2). To model traveling back in time, we condition on two
states instead of one, Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) where σk is an event
in the future with respect to time i. In this case,
P (pin) = p(σ1)T2(σ2|σ1) · · · Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) · · ·Tn(σn|σn−1)
(5)
All the conditional probabilities Tj(σj |σj−1) are the same
as in Eq. (4) except for Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk). Making such
a generalization is non-trivial because we need to check
that the basic axioms of probabilities continue to hold.
At this point, we would like to emphasize some key points
that are important in this paper,
1. Time travel consists of sending a signal back to the
past. The signal causes an effect only at one time
point t = i as in Fig. 2. The signal could contain
a set of instructions to carry out some tasks or be
an agent that travels back in time.
2. The conditional probabilities Tj , j = 1, 2, · · ·, j 6= i
in Eq. (4) are determined by the physics of how
the system evolves forward in time.
3. The term Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) is special as it is the only
term in Eq. (21) that encodes the effects of travel-
ing back in time.
4. Our framework is probabilistic, in which many se-
quences of states can happen with non-zero prob-
ability, in contrast to a deterministic view where
only one sequence is possible. Given any sequence
pin, its probability of occurrence can be calculated
using Eq. (21).
5. A paradox be represented by many different se-
quences of states. Our objective is to show that
either all these sequences happen with zero proba-
bility, or they result in violation of the basic axioms
of probability.
Consider Tˆi to be a function of three discrete variables,
σi−1, σi and σk. This function has to satisfy,
0 ≤ Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) ≤ 1 (6)
∑
{pin}
P (pin) = 1 (7)
∑
σi
Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) = 1 (8)
The first two conditions are analogous to Eq. (1) and (2).
The last condition is the local normalization condition.
Eq. (7) can be reduced to,∑
σi,σk
Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, σk)V (σk|σi) = 1 (9)
V (σk|σi) is the conditional probability of σk given
σi summed over all possible intermediate states
σi+1 · · ·σk−1. Detailed derivation of Eq. (9) is given
in Appendix A. This is an important equation. We will
use this equation together with Eq. (6) and (8) to show
that the grandfather paradox, Deutsch’s unproven the-
orem paradox and chicken-and-egg paradox have to be
precluded in time travel.
A. Two-state system
For a two-state system, σ takes the values {0, 1}. Using
Eq. (9) and (8) and summing over four combinations
σi+1, σk ∈ {0, 1}, we obtain,
[Tˆi(0|σ˜i−1, 1)− Tˆi(0|σ˜i−1, 0)][V (1|0)− V (1|1)] = 0 (10)
3We must have V (1|0) = V (1|1) or Tˆi(0|σ˜i, 1) =
Tˆi(0|σ˜i, 0). For the case when V (1|0) 6= V (1|1), the tran-
sition matrix Tˆi does not depend on σk. In this case,
the backward loop in Fig. 2 has no effect. We can’t
change the probability distribution of the past. For the
case V (1|0) = V (1|1), we could have Tˆi(0|σ˜i−1, 1) 6=
Tˆi(0|σ˜i−1, 0) and the transition probabilities at t = i
could be affected by a signal from future time (t = k).
B. Grandfather paradox in a two-state system
The grandfather paradox can be used to illustrate the
physical implications of Eq. (10). The basic assumptions
we will use are (i) resurrection is impossible, and (ii) basic
axioms of probabilities must be satisfied.
Consider an agent sending a signal back in time to
kill himself. Let us denote the dead state as σ = 0
and alive state as σ = 1. No resurrection implies that
V is of the form, V =
(
1 β∗
0 β
)
, β∗ = 1 − β. Let
Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 1) = S(σi|σ˜i−1) be the transition probabilities
for the scenario in which the agent sends a signal from
the future to kill himself. Let Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 0) = N(σi|σ˜i−1)
be the transition probabilities for the sequences of events
the agent is dead at t = k and hence no signal is sent
from the future to kill himself. Hence S (the “killing”
matrix) and N are of the form,
S =
(
1 1
0 0
)
N =
(
1 b∗
0 b
)
(11)
b∗ = 1−b is the probability of dying at t = i. Substituting
values of N , S and V into Eq. (10), we obtain [1−b∗]β =
0. Either b∗ = 1 or β = 0. When b∗ = 1 then N = S,
the agent dies at t = i with probability 1. If β = 0,
the agent dies sometime between t = i and t = k with
probability 1. In either case, the scenario in which the
agent is alive at t = k and thus able to send the signal
occurs with zero probability. Note that we are analyzing
probabilities rather than specific events.
The conclusion comes about because resurrection is
impossible (V (1|0) = 0). Suppose resurrection is pos-
sible, V (1|0) = α∗ < 1, the paradox goes away when
α∗ = β. Intuitively, if we allow resurrection, the agent
could send a signal back in time from t = k to kill himself
at t = i < k. Between the time t = i and t = k, the agent
is resurrected and hence could again send the signal at
t = k. There is no contradiction in this case.
Another way to resolve the paradox is to relax the
assumption that the agent always succeeds to kill himself.
In this case, the matrix S is
(
1 λ∗
0 λ
)
, λ > 0. Eq. (10)
gives, β(λ−b) = 0. If β = 0, then the agent dies sometime
between t = i and t = k. If λ = b then S = N , the
signal from the future could not change the transition
probability at t = i. The agent cannot change his own
fate by sending a signal to the past.
N(1|σ˜i)− S(1|σ˜i)
N(2|σ˜i)− S(2|σ˜i)
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
−a/b
FIG. 3. Shaded region shows the possible values of
N(1|σ˜i, 0) − S(1|σ˜i), (x-axis) and N(2|σ˜i, 0) − S(2|σ˜i), (y-
axis).
C. Deutsch’s unproven theorem paradox
An agent sends a signal containing the proof of a math-
ematical theorem back in time. The signal is encoded in
a document that the agent reads in future time. Denote
the existence of the proof as σ = 0 and absence of the
proof as σ = 1. A general form of V is, V =
(
α β∗
α∗ β
)
,
α∗ = 1 − α, β∗ = 1 − β. The basic assumptions we
use are (i) the transition from σ = 1 to σ = 0 (tran-
sition of absence of proof to existence of proof) hap-
pens solely through the signal traveling back in time,
and (ii) the transition from σ = 0 to σ = 1 happens
with zero probability (once the proof is obtained, it never
gets lost). Hence β = 1 and α∗ = 0. The transi-
tion probabilities are Tˆi(σi = 0|σ˜i−1 = 1, σk = 1) = 0
representing no signal sent if proof does not exist at
t = k (σk = 1). Tˆi(σi = 0|σ˜i−1 = 1, σk = 0) = 1
represents a signal being sent when the proof exists at
t = k. These basic assumptions contradict with Eq. (10),
[Tˆi(0|1, 1)−Tˆi(0|1, 0)](α
∗−β) = (0−1)(0−1) 6= 0. Hence
the assumptions are false and Deutsch’s unproven theo-
rem paradox is precluded.
The paradox can be resolved if we relax the assump-
tions. Suppose we allow the possibility that the proof can
get lost (α∗ ≥ 0) and that the proof can be derived by
some brilliant mathematician β ≤ 1. Then Eq. (10) can
be satisfied if α∗ = β. There is no paradox here because
the proof can be sent back in time and subsequently be
lost. It can be re-derived again and be sent back to the
past.
D. Three-state system
For a three-state system, σ takes the values {0, 1, 2}.
For simplicity, let Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 0) = N(σi|σ˜i−1) and
Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 1) = Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 2) = S(σi|σ˜i−1). Using Eq.
(8) and (9),
[N(1|σ˜i−1)− S(1|σ˜i−1)][V (0|1)− V (0|0)] + (12)
4[N(2|σ˜i−1)− S(2|σ˜i−1)][V (0|2)− V (0|0)] =0
this is an equation of the form xa + yb = 0 given
a = [V (0|1) − V (0|0)] and b = [V (0|2) − V (0|0)], x =
[N(1|σ˜i−1)− S(1|σ˜i−1)] and y = [N(2|σ˜i−1)−S(2|σ˜i−1)]
can be solved. There are in general infinitely many solu-
tions. From Eq. (6), the range of [N(1|σ˜i−1)−S(1|σ˜i−1)]
and [N(2|σ˜i−1)−S(2|σ˜i−1)] is bounded by the shaded re-
gion in Fig. 3. Given a and b, the set of solutions for x
and y contains all the points on the line shown in Fig. 3.
The slope of the line is given by −a/b. N 6= S implies
that transition to the state σi depends on future state σk,
that is, signals from the future can affect the probability
distribution of the past.
E. The grandfather paradox in a three-state system
Consider the three states represent healthy (σ = 2),
sick (σ = 1) and dead (σ = 0). First, we lay down our
assumptions,
1. Assume resurrection is impossible so that transition
from σ = 0 to σ 6= 0 happens with zero probability.
Then the matrix V is of the form,
V =

 1 α0 β00 α1 β1
0 α2 β2

 (13)
with α0 + α1 + α2 = 1 and β0 + β1 + β2 = 1.
2. The agent is able to send a signal back in time to
kill himself only if he is not dead at t = k.
Tˆi(σi|σi−1, 1) and Tˆi(σi|σi−1, 2) are the conditional prob-
abilities that the agent is alive and sends a signal back in
time to kill himself. Let, Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 1) = Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 2) =
S(σi|σ˜i−1). Tˆi(σi|σi−1, 0) is the conditional probability
that the agent is dead at t = k and can not send a sig-
nal back in time to kill himself. Let Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 0) =
N(σi|σ˜i−1). Hence S (the “killing” matrix) N are,
S =

 1 1 10 0 0
0 0 0

 N =

 1 a0 b00 a1 b1
0 a2 b2

 (14)
We have from Eq. (12),
a1(1 − α0) + a2(1− β0) = 0 (15)
b1(1− α0) + b2(1− β0) = 0
There are four cases in which Eq. (15) is satisfied.
1. α0 = 1 and β0 = 1. Then V = S which means the
agent is dead at t = k with probability 1 (recall
that S is the killing matrix).
2. α0 = 1 and β0 < 1. To satisfy Eq. (15), a2 =
b2 = 0. In this case the agent is dead at t = k with
probability 1 (see Appendix B for the proof).
3. α0 < 1 and β0 = 1. To satisfy Eq. (15), a1 =
b1 = 0. In this case the agent is dead at t = k with
probability 1 (see Appendix B for the proof).
4. α0 < 1 and β0 < 1. Then a1 = a2 = b1 = b2 = 0
and N = S which means the agent is dead at t = i
with probability 1.
In all cases, the agent is dead with probability 1 at t = k
and hence never has a chance to send a signal back in
time to kill himself. Suppose S is not the killing matrix
(Eq. (14)) or resurrection is possible, then this argument
does not hold, and the agent is able to alter his fate by
changing the probability of being healthy, sick or dead.
F. The chicken-and-egg paradox
Consider the chicken-and-egg paradox in which at time
t = k, a hen travels back in time to t = i to lay an egg.
The egg hatches into the hen herself. At this time point,
there are two copies of the hen, the older self and the
younger self (the chick). As both copies travel to time
t = k, the chick grow older and travels back in time to
lay the egg. This paradox seems “self-consistent” in the
sense that there is no contradiction in existence of the
hen and chick from one time point to another. However
the problem is the hen seems to pop out from nowhere.
There are three possible states, hen and chick (σ = 0),
hen only (σ = 1) and no hen and no chick (σ = 2). We
exclude the state of chick only, otherwise we would need
four states.
There are no hen and no chick initially, hence σ˜i−1 = 2.
Let Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 1) = Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 2) = N(σi|σ˜i−1). This is
the case when no chick travels back in time and hence
there remains no hen and no chick at t = i. Let
Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, 0) = S(σi|σ˜i−1), the chick travels back in time
from t = k to t = i. The matrices S and N are,
S =

 1 0 00 1 1
0 0 0

 N =

 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

 (16)
The matrix V is of the form,
V =

 α0 β0 0α1 β1 0
α2 β2 1

 (17)
The first two columns are general expressions with∑2
j=0 αj = 1 and
∑2
j=0 βj = 1. The last column is
(0, 0, 1)T because when there is no hen and no chick at
time t = i, then there will be no hen and no chick at
t = k. Now consider the probability,
P (σ˜i−1, σi, σk) = p(σ˜i−1)Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, σk)V (σk|σi) (18)
p(σ˜i−1) is the probability of sampling the state σ˜i−1.
Since σ˜i−1 = 2, p(σ˜i−1) = δσ˜i−1,2. We remind the reader
5that the probability distribution V is the sum of prob-
abilities over all possible intermediate sequences. The
chicken-and-egg paradox requires both hen and chick to
be present at t = k (σk = 0) and the chick to appear at
t = i (σi = 1), all intermediate states can take arbitrary
values. Reading off entries from matrices S and V ,
P (σ˜i−1 = 2, σi = 1, σk = 0) = β0 (19)
Using Eq. (12) we can calculate what β0 should be,
[1− 0](β0 − α0)− [0− 1]α0 = 0 (20)
⇒ β0 = 0
The sum of probabilities of all possible sequences of states
that represent the chicken-and-egg paradox equals zero.
Therefore the chicken-and-egg event happens with zero
probability.
III. DISCUSSION
We have shown, using a graphical model with a
loop back into the past, that the grandfather paradox,
Deutsch’s unproven theorem paradox and the chicken-
and-egg paradox are precluded in time travel. We have
also demonstrated that changing the probability distribu-
tions of the past is possible when no contradicting events
are present. For the paradoxes we discussed in this paper,
we gave scenarios in which the paradoxes are resolved.
Our analysis is based on isolated two- and three-state
systems.
For future work, it would be useful to generalize our
formalism to arbitrary systems. Lastly, in cases when the
causal relationship between events at different times are
very complex, the existence of time travel paradoxes in
these cases may be very subtle. We hope that our math-
ematical framework can be used to uncover new time
travel paradoxes, especially those that are embedded in
complex interactions of events and are not obvious.
The author would like to thank Mui Leng Seow and
Ivana Mihalek for proofreading this article.
IV. APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF EQ. (9)
Probability of a sequence pin is given by,
P (pin) = p(σ1)T2(σ2|σ1) · · · Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) · · ·Tn(σn|σn−1)
(21)
Summing over all sequences,∑
{pin}
P (pin) = (22)
∑
σ1,σ2,···,σn
p(σ1)T2(σ2|σ1) · · · Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk) · · ·Tn(σn|σn−1)
Since
∑
σj
Tj(σj |σj−1) = 1∀j, summation can be evalu-
ated recursively between σk+1 and σn. That is,∑
σk+1,···σn
Tk+1(σk+1|σk) · · ·Tn(σn|σn−1) = 1 (23)
Next define,
U(σi−1) =
∑
σ1,···σi−2
p(σ1)T2(σ2|σ1) · · ·Ti−1(σi−1|σi−2)
(24)
V (σk|σi) =
∑
σi+1,···σk−1
Ti+1(σi+1|σi) · · ·Tk(σk|σk−1)
(25)
Then Eq. (22) becomes,∑
{pin}
P (pin) =
∑
σi−1,σi,σk
U(σi−1)Tˆi(σi|σi−1, σk)V (σk|σi)
(26)
The objective is to find the conditions in which∑
{pin}
P (pin) = 1. U(σi−1) is the probability of sampling
the state σi−1, it depends on the conditional probabilities
Tj, j ≤ i−1 and the initial condition p(σ1). We therefore
have the freedom to choose U for example, by choosing
different initial conditions. Holding T and V fixed, we
require
∑
P (pin) = 1 for different choices of U , in which
we arrive at,∑
σi,σk
Tˆi(σi|σ˜i−1, σk)V (σk|σi) = 1 (27)
V. APPENDIX B: THE GRANDFATHER
PARADOX IN A THREE-STATE SYSTEM
We present the proof that for the grandfather paradox
in a three-state system, the probability that the agent is
dead at t = k is one. We consider cases II and III in
which Eq. (15) is satisfied,
A. Case II: α0 = 1 and β0 < 1
In this case, a2 = b2 = 0 and,
V =

 1 1 β00 0 β1
0 0 β2

 (28)
N =

 1 a0 b00 a1 b1
0 0 0

 (29)
We calculate the probability that the agent is dead,
P (σk = 0) =
∑
σ1,···,σk−1
p(σ1)T2(σ2|σ1) · · ·
=
∑
σi−1,σi
U(σi−1)Tˆi(σi|σi−1, 0)V (0|σi)
=
∑
σi−1,σi
U(σi−1)N(σi|σi−1)V (0|σi) (30)
Reading off the entries of matrices V and N in Eq. (28)
and (29), we get
∑
σi
N(σi|σi−1)V (0|σi) = 1 for all σi−1.
Hence P (σk = 0) = 1.
6B. Case III: α0 < 1 and β0 = 1
In this case, a1 = b1 = 0 and,
V =

 1 α0 10 α1 0
0 α2 0

 (31)
N =

 1 a0 b00 0 0
0 a2 b2

 (32)
We calculate the probability that the agent is dead, using
Eq. (30) and reading off the entries of matrices V and N
in Eq. (31) and (32), we get
∑
σi
N(σi|σi−1)V (0|σi) = 1
for all σi−1. Hence P (σk = 0) = 1.
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